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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 804(b)(1): FORMER TESTIMONY
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) states:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition
taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. I
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) prevents the exclusion of
former testimony of a witness as hearsay if the witness is
unavailable to testify. 2 However, this rule is not as broad as it
may appear with respect to exactly what -former testimony" will
be admitted. In United States v. Salerno,3 the United States
Supreme Court noted that former testimony is admissible when
the opposing party had a similar motive while questioning the
witness in both proceedings. 4 Moreover, the court held that this
requirement of a "similar motive" is not waivable, even in the
5
interest of adversarial fairness.

1. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
2. Id.
3. 505 U.S. 317 (1992).

4. In the concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun describes the "similar
motive" requirement as follows:
Because similar motive" does not mean "identical motive," the similarmotive inquiry ...is inherently a factual inquiry, depending in part on
the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the grand
jury questioning.... Moreover, like other inquiries involving the
admission of evidence, the similar-motive inquiry appropriately reflects
narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence admitted at trial-not broad policy concerns favoring either Government in the conduct of
grand jury proceedings or the defendant in overcoming the refusal of
other witnesses to testify.
Id.at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
5. Id.at 325.
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Salerno involved a criminal proceeding in which the defendants
sought to admit grand jury transcripts of the testimony of two
witnesses, who were allegedly members of the Genovese Family
of La Cosa Nostra crime organization, in order to refute claims
made by the government. 6 The witnesses, who had been granted
immunity before the grand jury, invoked their Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination upon being subpoenaed by the
respondent. 7 The parties agreed that the witnesses were
"unavailable" and that the grand jury testimony was "[tiestimony
given as a witness at another hearing" in accordance with Rule
804(b)(1). 8 However, the parties disagreed as to whether the
admissibility of the testimony be used based on the "similar
motive" requirement. 9 The Supreme Court stressed that
"[n]othing in the language of Rule 804(b)(1) suggests that a court
may admit former testimony absent satisfaction of each of the
Rule's elements." 10 Accordingly, the "similar motive" element
must be satisfied before former testimony may be introduced. 11
Salerno is illustrative of Rule 804(b)(1) because it delineates
the federal parameters of "proceeding," "unavailable witness,"
and "similar motive." 12 First, Salerno demonstrates that former
testimony in grand jury proceedings comes under the umbrella of
Rule 804(b)(1). 13 Second, the case illustrates that witnesses who
invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
meet the unavailability requirement. 14 Finally, Salerno stands for
the proposition that where a party did not have the "similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect

6. Id. at 318-19.

7. Id. at 319.
8. Id. at 321. The witnesses were deemed "unavailable" because they had
"properly invoked [their) Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify."
Id.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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examination," 15 the former testimony will not qualify as a
hearsay exception. 16
Former testimony can be offered under Rule 804(b)(1) in

federal proceedings if the party or a predecessor in interest of the
party "against whom the testimony is now offered.., had an
17
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony .... "

McCormick offers two approaches used by courts when applying
the ambiguous term "predecessor in interest." 18 First, the
,'community of interest" approach "requires some connectionsome shared interest, albeit far less than a formal relationshipthat helps to insure adequacy of cross-examination."

19

The

second approach is broader in that it requires the federal courts to
"insure fairness directly by seriously considering whether the
prior cross-examination can be fairly held against the later
party." 20 If the objecting party can show inadequacy in the cross21
examination, the former testimony may not be introduced.

15. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380
(7th Cir. 1985). The court, in Feldman, listed several factors to consider
whether a "similar motive" existed, including "(1) the type of proceeding in
which the testimony is given, (2) trial strategy, (3) the potential penalties or
financial stakes, and (4) the number of issues and parties." Id. at 385 (citation
omitted).
16. Salerno, 505 U.S. at 321. The requirement of Rule 804(b)(1) that the
statements be given under oath does not concern adversarial fairness. Id. at
320-23. Rather, it applies to the literal meaning of the word -testimony," that
is, "statements made under oath or affirmation." Id. at 322. Also, the Court
rejected the respondents' argument that the Government forfeited its right to
admit testimony by later admitting contradictory evidence. Id. at 323.
17. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
18. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 303, at 314 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Compare Mark Lawrence, The Admissibility of Former Testimony
Under Rule 804(b)(1): Defining a Predecessor in Interest. 42 U. MiAMi L.
REV. 975, 977 (1987). The author explains: "[Mlost federal courts employ
analytical approaches that in effect ignore the predecessor-in-interest
requirement ....
These courts rely instead on the trustworthy nature of the
former testimony itself.... Consequently, the term 'predecessor in interest."
which appears in the rule's text, has become a dead letter.- Id.: iit
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The New York law on admissibility of former testimony is
addressed in Criminal Procedure Law section 670.10 [hereinafter
C.P.L.] 22 for criminal actions and Civil Practice Law and Rules
section 451723 [hereinafter C.P.L.R.] for civil actions. In order
§ 303, at 518 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) (explaining that the predecessor-in-interest analysis can be avoided if
courts focus on the "adequacy of the testing of the prior testimony"); see, e.g.,
Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1978)
(adopting the community-of-interest approach without employing the
predecessor-in-interest requirement); Pacelli v. Nassau County Police Dep't,
639 F. Supp 1382 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (utilizing the community-of-interest
approach and avoiding the predecessor-of-interest requirement).
22. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670. 10 (McKinney 1992). This section states:
1. Under circumstances prescribed in this article, testimony given by a
witness at:
(a) a trial of an accusatory instrument, or
(b) a hearing upon a felony complaint conducted pursuant to section
180.60, or
(c) an examination of such witness conditionally, conducted pursuant to
article six hundred sixty, may, where otherwise admissible, be
received into evidence at a subsequent proceeding in or relating to
the action involved when at the time of such subsequent proceeding
the witness is unable to attend the same by reason of death, illness
or incapacity, or cannot with due diligence be found, or is outside
the state or in federal custody and cannot with due diligence be
brought before the court. Upon being received into evidence, such
testimony may be read and any videotape or photographic
recording thereof played. Where any recording is received into
evidence, the stenographic transcript of that examination shall also
be received.
2. The subsequent proceedings at which such testimony may be received
in evidence consist of:
(a) Any proceeding constituting a part of a criminal action based upon
the charge or charges which were pending against the defendant at
the time of the witness's testimony and to which such testimony
related; and
(b) Any post-judgment proceeding in which a judgment of conviction
upon a charge specified in paragraph (a) is challenged.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

Id.

23. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4517 (McKinney 1992). Section 4517
states:
In a civil action, if a witness' testimony is not available because of
privilege, death, physical or mental illness, absence beyond the
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for former testimony to be admissible in New York, the

testimony must fall into one of three categories outlined in People
v. Peterson.24 Those categories include: "(1)

a trial of an

accusatory instrument, or (2) a hearing upon a felony complaint
conducted pursuant to [C.P.L.] Section 180.60, or (3) an
examination of a witness conditionally conducted pursuant to
Article 660 [of the Penal Law]. " 25 In addition, New York

requires that the offered testimony originate from a witness who

26
is unavailable or is unable to be found with due diligence.
In Fleury v. Edwards,27 the court of appeals stated that the
early legislative equivalent of C.P.L.R. 4517 must be interpreted
in conjunction with the common lav and that "while the statute
authorizes the after-death use of prior testimony, it is not
intended to state the precise and only circumstances under which

jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process or absence
because the proponent of his statement does not know and with diligence
has been unable to ascertain his whereabouts, or because he is
incompetent to testify by virtue of section 4519, his testimony, taken or
introduced in evidence at a former trial, together with all exhibits and
documents introduced in connection with it, may be introduced in
evidence by any party upon any trial of the same subject-matter in the
same or another action between the same parties or their
representatives, subject to any objection to admissibility other than
hearsay. Such testimony may not be used if the witness' unavailability
was procured by, or through the culpable neglect or wrongdoing of, the
proponent of his statement. The original stenographic notes of testimony
taken by a stenographer who has since died or become incompetent may
be read in evidence by any person whose competency to read them
accurately is established to the satisfaction of the court.
Id.
24. 160 A.D.2d 563, 554 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1st Dep't 1990).
25. Id. at 564, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
26. See supra note 22 for an exhaustive list of the unavailability
requirement for admission of prior testimony in subsequent criminal
proceedings. See also People v. Robinson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 549 (4th Dep't 1996)
(holding that "[a] defendant has the constitutional right to introduce the prior
testimony of an unavailable witness at trial if he establishes that (1) the
evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability, and (2) the witness is no longer
available.")
27. 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964).
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such use is permissible.", 28 Thus, although the statute refers to
admissible testimony from a former civil trial where the witness
is now deceased, 29 the court of appeals has extended its
applicability to administrative proceedings. 30 The Fleury court,
therefore, held that where the deceased had given testimony at a
motor vehicle administrative proceeding, that testimony could be
offered in a subsequent civil action because it had the same
degree of reliability as if it had been given in a judicial
proceeding.31
There are similarities and differences between Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(1) and New York law. Both jurisdictions have
recognized that a witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination meets the requirement of
unavailability. 3 2 However, a significant difference between the
two jurisdictions exists concerning the unavailability of a witness
due to the culpable neglect of the offeror of the former testimony.
That is, although New York law does not allow introduction of
former testimony of an individual whose unavailability was
caused by the proponent's "culpable neglect," 33 federal law only
disallows the former testimony if the witness' unavailability is
due to the deliberate "procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent." 34 New York law is also more restrictive in criminal
cases because it limits the introduction of former testimony to the
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 338, 200 N.E.2d at 552, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
See supra note 23.
Fleury, 14 N.Y.2d at 339, 200 N.E.2d at 553, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
Id. at 338-39, 200 N.E.2d at 552-53, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The court

stated that "[the testimony] was given under oath, referred to the same subjectmatter, and was heard in a tribunal where the other side was represented and
allowed to cross-examine." Id.
32. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992) (holding that
the witnesses were "unavailable" to the defense as they "properly invoked the
Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify."); People v. Brown, 26
N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970) (holding that the rule in
New York should allow an "admission against penal interest" to be received
when the person making the admission will not testify to the fact on the ground
of self incrimination).
33. N.Y. Ctv. PRAC. L. & R. 4517. See supra note 23.
34. FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
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three specific situations enumerated in C.P.L. 670.10. 35 Federal
36
Rule 804(b)(1) contains no such restriction.
Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is more liberal
than New York law in that the rule has been construed to allow
introduction of former testimony where the prosecutor has made
a good faith effort to produce the witness and such witness either
refuses to answer, claims memory loss, or otherwise invokes his
or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 37 In
New York, no such provision exists. Thus, Rule 804(b)(1) is
more flexible in the introduction of former testimony into
evidence than New York law.

35. See supra note 22.
36. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
37. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-69 (1970).
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